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Abstract 
Objective. Human performance risks and benefits of adaptive systems were identified through a 
systematic analysis and pilot evaluation of adaptive system component types and characteristics. 
Background. As flight-deck automation is able to process ever more types of information in 
sophisticated ways to identify situations, it is becoming more realistic for adaptive systems to 
adapt behavior based on their own authority.  
Method. A framework was developed to describe the types and characteristics of adaptive 
system components and was used to perform a risk/benefit analysis to identify potential issues. 
Subsequently, eight representative adaptive system storyboards were developed for an evaluation 
with pilots to augment the analysis results and to explore more detailed issues and potential risk 
mitigations.  
Results. Analysis identified the principal drivers of adaptive “triggering conditions” risk as 
complexity and transparency. It also identified the drivers of adaptations risks/benefits as the task 
level and the level of control vs. information adaptation.   
Conclusions. Pilots did not seem to distinguish between adaptive automation and normal 
automation if the rules were simple and obvious; however, their perception of risk increased 
when the level of complexity and opacity of triggering conditions reached a point where its 
behavior was perceived as non-deterministic.  
 
Keywords: adaptive automation, Human-automation interaction, flight-deck design, risk 
and benefit analysis 
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Introduction 
Risk in aviation has typically been related to air traffic accidents that result in significant 
loss of property or loss of life (Netjasov & Janic, 2008).  The level of risk is generally 
determined from a combination of the probability of occurrence and the consequences (Sheridan, 
2008). In the development of new technology, designers try to identify risks that stem from 
design and component failure, and factor in the risk of human error (Orasanu, Fischer, & 
Davison, 2002. The objective of this work is to anticipate the risks and benefits of adaptive 
systems as they are introduced onto aircraft flight decks, and thus is concerned primarily with the 
design factors of the technology and human factors of the adaptive joint pilot-automation 
systems that determine the level of predicted risk and benefit.   
Adaptive systems are the automation component of joint human-machine systems that can 
change their behavior to meet changing user needs, often without explicit human instructions 
(Scerbo, 2001).  Adaptive systems do this by tracking and sensing information about users, their 
current tasks, the state of the systems they interact with, and their environment.  Adaptive 
systems are growing in importance as the next generation (NextGen) air traffic management 
systems (ATM) are being realized.  NextGen will use satellite-based navigation and 
interconnected database systems to guide and track air traffic more precisely than was previously 
feasible (FAA, 2015.  NextGen will increase capacity using reduced aircraft spacing and faster- 
paced ground operations, delegating more responsibility to the pilots for spacing from other 
aircraft, and requiring more precise navigation on defined routes, altitudes, and times of arrival at 
specified waypoints.  NextGen implementation will require new, more complex automation 
(Landry, 2009) and may result in substantial changes in pilot and controller roles and 
responsibilities.  Furthermore, the division of roles and responsibilities between humans and 
automated systems may not be static, but may change depending on the current context.  
Automated systems may have to adapt to the situation and change their behavior, under specific 
conditions (based on predetermined decision criteria and functions designed into the 
automation), in order to best support the pilot needs in the current situation.   
Flight-deck automated systems are able to adapt their behavior based on flight-situational 
priorities and context because they have increased sophistication and processing capability that 
enable them to integrate aircraft data, sensor data, stored databases, communicated information, 
and real-time flight crew inputs.  For instance, an adaptive flight-deck automation system might 
intervene (e.g., when preprogrammed parameter limits are exceeded indicating that the pilot 
needs additional assistance) or perform preselected “overhead” tasks (such as information, 
communication or display management) to address the pilot’s needs in the current and predicted 
situation.  This can reduce pilot workload and allow pilots to focus more on primary flight tasks 
and less on accessing and retrieving information, configuring their displays, categorizing and 
prioritizing communications, and so on.  Of course, realization of these benefits depends on 
detailed design features of the adaptive systems.  Real-time adaptations also have significant 
potential disadvantages due to complexity that leads to incomplete flight crew comprehension 
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and awareness of automation programming.  If the outputs are less predictable to pilots, there 
may be more opportunity for unexpected automation behavior that surprises the flight crew, 
compromised pilot situation awareness, and cases where the automated system adaptation is 
inappropriate to the situation and provides outputs that are annoying, or worse, disruptive to 
flight crew performance.    
While extensive literature exists on the development of adaptive systems concepts 
(Sheridan and Verplank, 1978; Rouse, 1988; Endsley and Kaber, 1999; Parasuraman, Sheridan, 
& Wickens, 2000; Rothrock et al. 2002; Feigh, Dorneich, & Hayes, 2012; Kaber, 2013), 
relatively sparse data exist on human-performance risks and benefits with adaptive systems in 
real operational settings Hilburn, Molloy, Wong, & Parasuraman, 1993; Dorneich, Ververs, 
Mathan, Whitlow & Hayes,2012), where safety and human performance depend on dynamic 
interaction of tasks, operators, and the environment.    
In order to address these issues, an adaptive system framework is presented that identifies 
and characterizes its components, the various design options (types) for each component, and the 
characteristics on which to evaluate the risks and benefits for each type. A risk/benefit analysis 
was performed to identify potential issues.  Subsequently, an evaluation with pilots was 
conducted to provide the pilot perspective when exploring issues and potential risk mitigations.  
The value of this work is in identifying risks and benefits that should be considered when 
evaluating adaptive flight-deck automation that will enable safe and efficient flight in a NextGen 
environment.  
Adaptive Systems Framework 
Three key areas were identified within a generic closed-loop adaptive system (see Figure 
1) as the most relevant for the analysis of risks and benefits: 
 
 Triggers. Knowledge of context (the state of the world, human, mission, and system) 
used as a trigger to initiate changes in the adaptations manager.  
 Decision processing. Algorithmic process to determine when and what adaptive 
automation to invoke. 
 Adaptations. Temporary changes in automation behaviors and/or human-machine 
interface, designed to mitigate situations identified by triggers. 
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Figure 1. A generic adaptive system block diagram. 
This paper focuses on triggers and adaptations, the system elements most observable to 
operators, and thus most applicable to human-factors risks and benefits. The analysis of triggers 
and adaptations is the subject of the next section. An analysis of the decision-processing risks 
was also conducted but only a summary of findings is presented as follows. Complex statistical 
processes (linear discriminant models, neural nets) that suffer from a lack of transparency were 
deemed highest risk. The second group of processes (behavioral models, decision matrices, and 
Bayesian inference) were also seen as complex but were ranked to have lower overall risk given 
that they are based in human-understandable terms and thus are more intuitive and transparent.  
Decisions based on production rules were deemed the least risky, as they are repeatable, fast, and 
not necessarily complex. However, they suffer from a lack of robustness and sensitivity to 
change. For more detail, see Dorneich, Rogers, Whitlow & De Mers (2012). 
Types and Characteristics 
Types of triggers and adaptations are defined as specific options within each area’s design 
space.  For instance, trigger types include task status, operator-state measurements, and 
environmental events.  Likewise, examples of types of adaptations include task offloading, task 
prioritization, and interruptions management.  
Additionally, triggers and adaptations can be described by a unique set of characteristics, 
defined as properties or attributes that describe an automation system’s operation, and can be 
used to identify potential human-factors issues.  
Triggers. There are many sources of information upon which an adaptive system can 
develop a sense of the current situation, including information which can be sensed, observed, or 
modeled.  While there are many possible categorizations (Byrne and Parasuraman, 1996; Rouse, 
1988; Sheridan and Parasuraman, 2006), five broad categories were identified (Feigh et al., 
2012) as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Taxonomy of triggers, based on Feigh, Dorneich, & Hayes (2012). 
Operator triggers can be operator initiated or derived through measurements of the 
operator. When pilot action triggers adaptation, these systems are typically referred to as 
adaptable systems (Opperman, 1994), and this is included here for completeness. Measures of 
operator cognitive or physical states can be estimated via sensor data, inferred via models, or 
derived via interaction with the system (Scerbo, 2001).  Estimates of the system include its 
modes of interaction, and current and anticipated future states. Estimates of the task/mission 
depend on a dynamic representation of tasks performed by the joint human-automation system 
(Krogsaeter & Thomas, 1994) to enable task-status tracking and the detection of mission events. 
Estimates of the environment are a representation of the events and states of the world outside of 
the immediate system and operator. Estimates of spatio-temporal criteria include time and 
location. Table 1 describes each trigger type, based on the taxonomy in Figure 2, and includes a 
representative example.  
Table 1. Trigger Types. 
Trigger Type Category Trigger Type Definition Example 
Operator-
Initiated   
Operator 
Pilot action required to trigger adaptation. 
Typically referred to as adaptable systems, 
included here for completeness. 
Pilots changing autopilot descent mode (Sarter & 
Woods, 1995) 
Operator 
Measurement 
Operator 
Direct real-time measurement of operator 
physical or neurophysiological state or 
indirect measurement via secondary 
measures such as task performance. 
Electroencephalogram-based assessment of 
workload (Dorneich et al, 2007). 
System 
Modes 
System 
Grouping of several system configurations 
that corresponds to a set of unique system 
behaviors. 
Cell phone in “airplane mode” to prevent signal 
transmission. 
System States System Current configuration of automation, aircraft, 
or systems. 
Aircraft may be at a fuel level that requires a 
diversion decision (“bingo fuel”) 
Mission Event Task/Mission Mission events based on a mission plan  
Trigger based on transition between phases of 
flight 
Task Status  Task/Mission 
Current task state (e.g. initialization, 
progress, or completion), usually based on a 
task model. 
Trigger changes based on a model of action 
planned, and completed tasks (Miller & Funk, 
1997) 
Environmental 
Events  
Environment 
External conditions, such as weather, traffic, 
terrain, or some combination. 
Sensor-based detection of proximity to terrain 
Environmental 
State  
Environment 
An environmental state external to the 
aircraft that is detected either automatically 
or through communications from other crew 
member, other aircraft, or ground personnel. 
External communications of runway closure; 
Detection of ambient light levels to determine 
screen brightness (Feigh et al., 2012) 
 
Location Spatio-temporal 
Absolute or relative location of the 
automation 
GPS location of aircraft; Five miles from top-of-
descent. 
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Time Spatio-temporal Temporal criterion  Trigger based on time in flight. 
 
The set of characteristics was developed (see Table 2) based on a variety of background 
material, including EASA AMC 25.1302 (2011), human-error categories (Stanton et al., 2010; 
Embrey, 1986; Pocock, Wright, & Harrison, 1999; IATA, 2007), and known automation human-
factors issues (Rogers, 2011).   
Table 2. Characteristics of triggers. 
Trigger Characteristic Risk/Benefit Characteristic Definition 
Complexity Inference complexity; number of pieces of data needed to calculate trigger 
Transparency The ability of the system to communicate why and when it will trigger a change. 
Projectability Reliability of the system to predict a future state (in a useful time frame)   
Resolution The ability of the system to resolve multiple levels of triggers that are useful 
Sensor/Data reliability Likelihood that the trigger data are reliably available and noise-free 
State assessment reliability Reliability of inferring a state from raw data 
Pilot interaction requirements Amount of interaction required of pilot to explicitly support trigger 
Acceptance/Trust Confidence of the pilots in the trigger 
 
Adaptations. Possible adaptations can be broken down into four broad categories (Feigh et 
al., 2012), illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
 Modification of Function Allocation.  A system can dynamically change who (human or 
machine) performs each function.     
 Modification of Interaction.  A system can dynamically change how it presents 
information to users.   
 Modification of Content.  A system can dynamically change what information it presents 
to the user. 
  Modification of Task Scheduling.  A system can dynamically change when tasks are 
performed, including which tasks are performed first. 
 
Figure 3. Taxonomy of Adaptations, based on Feigh, Dorneich, & Hayes (2012). 
Based on the taxonomy in Figure 3, descriptions and examples are provided in Table 3 for 
several types of adaptations. 
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Table 3. Adaptations Types.  
Adaptations Types Category Description Examples 
Task Sharing Function Allocation 
Automation and human 
share execution of the task 
Sharing of lateral and vertical 
navigation control between pilot and 
automation (Inagaki, 2003) 
Task Offloading Function Allocation 
Automation alternatively 
takes over task from 
human, and returns task to 
manual 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS III) will take over 
the function of flying an airplane 
when a collision with another aircraft 
is imminent (Botargues, 2008). 
Modality  Interaction 
Presentation modality is 
adapted  
Change message from text to speech 
Interaction style Interaction 
Changes to the timing, 
politeness, and/or method 
of interaction 
Tutoring systems that change the 
etiquette of feedback to mitigate user 
frustration. 
Interface features Interaction 
Changes to the location 
and/or saliency of 
presented information 
Highlighting information on a 
display; content-dependent menus. 
Amount of interaction Interaction 
Changes to the how often, 
how much, and when the 
human interacts with the 
system 
Tutoring systems that recede into the 
background as the student expertise 
grows (Dorneich & Jones, 2001). 
Abstraction Content 
Information can be 
aggregated or abstracted to 
focus on salient aspects and 
reduce the processing time 
for the human to interpret 
the presented information 
Changing from detailed system 
display to higher-level summary (e.g. 
star display). Ecological Interface 
Design strives to choose the correct 
abstraction for key functional 
relationships (Burns & 
Hajdukiewicz, 2004) 
Information Quantity & 
Timing 
Content 
How much information to 
present, when to present it 
De-cluttering to remove information 
during extreme attitudes (Newman & 
Haworth, 2004); Display 
reconfiguration during emergency. 
Quality  Content 
Changes in the quality of 
the information content  
Reducing video stream frame rate to 
meet task deadline (Mohan, Smith, & 
Li, 1999). 
Duration Task Scheduling 
The amount of time 
allocated (may affect 
quality of response) 
Change time allocation to minimize 
slack time and optimize resources 
(Tulga & Sheridan, 1980) 
Prioritization Task Scheduling  
Task ordering, task 
switching 
Alerting systems 
Timing Task Scheduling  
When to direct attention 
away from or keep 
attention on the current task 
Scheduling communications to 
highlight important messages or 
defer less important messages 
(Dorneich et al, 2012) 
 
A set of 26 characteristics was developed that define the attributes used to judge the risks 
of the adaptation types (see Table 4). The characteristics were developed based on the same 
sources used to develop Table 2.  
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Table 4. Adaptations risk characteristics. 
Characteristic Adaptation Characteristic Definition 
Authority change Magnitude of change in traditional pilot authority 
Complexity How complicated is the adaptation from the pilot's perspective 
Transparency How detectable (by the human) and understandable is the adaptation 
Predictability Humans can reliably predict adaptation output based on situation 
Accuracy The degree of which a measurement, calculation, or specification conforms to correct value 
Pilot interaction 
requirements 
Magnitude of additional pilot interaction requirements to make adaptation work as intended 
Acceptability Are pilots likely to use the system if given a choice 
Robustness Accuracy of results in the face of inaccuracies/noise in the inputs 
Disruptiveness Degree to which adaptation disrupts current task 
Ease of override & reversal How difficult would it be to undo impact of adaptation once triggered 
Trust/complacency Likelihood that adaptation will lead pilots to over-trust it and cease to scrutinize its performance 
Knowledge & skill 
requirements 
Level of knowledge/skill required to make adaptation useful 
Communication & 
coordination requirements 
Level of additional human-human communication and coordination required to make 
adaptation useful 
Distraction potential Degree to which adaptation distracts from other task responsibilities 
Understandability Does pilot understand what the outputs of the adaptation are and their implications 
Integration impact 
Integration impact of additional capabilities required to support adaptation (certification risk 
increases with scope of system impact) 
Novelty 
Degree of difference from current systems (more difference has higher inherent certification 
risk) 
Interference 
Probability of changing the way pilots interact with existing systems (and interference with task 
flow, scanning behavior, etc.) 
Misleading information 
potential 
Likelihood that adaptation could generate misleading information that could induce pilot error 
and/or confusion 
Failure modes 
Potential for negative impact to pilot performance when system fails or adaptation fails or stops 
inappropriately 
Situation awareness Negative impact on situation awareness 
Workload impact Amount of extra pilot workload that adaptation induces 
Usability impact How easy is the system to use 
Trainability impact How easy is it for pilots to learn how to use adaptive system effectively 
Pilot Performance How well does adaptation support human task performance 
Error detectability How easy is it to detect erroneous system behavior 
 
Six of the characteristics were used to judge the benefits for adaptation:  situation 
awareness, workload, usability, trainability, pilot performance, and error detectability. These 
were chosen from the larger set of 26 characteristics because they reflect the human-performance 
constructs by which human-factors benefits on the flight deck are typically described.  
Analysis 
Method 
Objectives.  The objective was to assess potential human performance risks and benefits 
relevant to adaptive system design.   
Protocol.  Both triggers and adaptation types were evaluated. The two system-based 
trigger types were combined (System States & Modes), and the two spatio-temporal trigger types 
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(Time & Location) were combined, resulting in eight triggers being evaluated. The adaptation 
type Information Quality was not included in the analysis, resulting in 11 adaptations types being 
evaluated. Two-dimensional scoring matrices were defined with types (rows) and characteristics 
(columns) for trigger risk (8x8 matrix), adaptations risk (11x26 matrix), and adaptations benefit 
(11x6 matrix).     
For this study, risk was defined as factors that may lead to unsafe outcomes or failure of 
the automation to operate as intended. For both the analysis and the pilot evaluation, the term 
risk was left largely undefined beyond this basic definition so as not to constrain feedback from 
participants. Both groups of participants were asked to assess predicted system risks of new 
technology that has not been implemented fully, so historical trend data may not match with 
expected or predicted risks (Rose, 2008). Likewise, benefits were focused on operational, safety, 
or crew performance improvements due to the technology. 
A team of three analysts rated each combination of characteristics and types (i.e., matrix 
cell) on a scale of 1 (low) to 5 (high). Low risk would not impact safety/aircraft operation/crew 
workload, and high risk might cause a crash. Low benefit would be lack of any improvements 
where high benefit would greatly improve safety/aircraft operation/crew workload.  For instance, 
a matrix cell might ask the analyst to rate the risk associated with the potential disruptiveness 
(characteristic) of a task offloading (type) adaptation.  The analyst team raters each had over 10 
years of experience in adaptive systems.  Each analyst individually provided ratings with 
rationale.  The final ratings were based on a series of reconciliation meetings where the three 
analysts presented their rationale each in turn, discussed and resolved discrepant ratings, and 
determined one rating per cell. The team established a secondary process if they could not come 
to a consensus agreement (i.e. asking an outside expert to “break the impasse”). However, in all 
cases, analysts were able to reach consensus. 
Assumptions and Limitations.   
The characteristics developed to assess risks of adaptations were derived from a systematic 
review of the literature and existing guidance material; However, the current set of 
characteristics could contain redundancies. This would result in some risks being “double-
counted,” thereby giving more weight to the riskier characteristics and increasing the average 
risk. For instance, if the characteristics of transparency and trust/overreliance capture the same 
risks, then perhaps the ability of the pilots to understand a system’s inner workings 
(transparency) was directly responsible for the pilots’ level of reliance (trust/overreliance).  
Another limitation is inherent in any process that requires consensus in a team, including 
limited time, ideas not thoroughly discussed by team, dominant personalities, non-contributing 
members, ineffective communication, conflict between team members, and inability to focus on 
the task (Catlett & Harper, 1992). The process was designed to mitigate some of these issues. 
Team members were asked to rate items individually first, thus their opinions were more likely 
to be heard. The process was designed to limit discussion to the most important items, and those 
discussions were focused by giving team members numbers to react to.  
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This analysis was based on a risk assessment method where the values assigned to the risks 
and benefits relied solely on expert judgment.  The data collected was subjective, and should be 
considered as a preliminary, top-down first pass at quantifying the risks and benefits.  
Results 
For each of the three matrices, the types were ordered by the analysts’ ratings, with 
qualitative groupings into higher, intermediate, and lower categories.  It should be noted that 
these groupings are somewhat arbitrary, and primarily serve to distinguish rating levels relative 
to each other. The three scoring matrices are presented in the Appendix. The characteristics that 
were the strongest drivers of ratings are discussed below.  
Triggers. Risk scores for each type of adaptive system trigger were averaged across 
characteristics to create an overall risk score (see Figure 4). The full ratings matrix can be found 
in Figure 11 in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 4. Risk ratings for each trigger type. 
The higher-rated risk triggers included task tracking and direct measurement of operator 
state, driven by issues related to complexity, transparency, and state assessment reliability.  
Intermediate-rated risk triggers included conditions external to the humans or the automation 
itself:  communications, mission parameters, and environmental events.  The lower-rated risk 
triggers included the automation system states and modes, operator initiation, and spatio-
temporal parameters.   
Task Status.  Risk is driven by complexity and state assessment reliability. Pilot 
understanding can be compromised by lack of observability of the raw task-tracking data as well 
as the high inferencing requirement.  Absence of sufficient task data could compromise 
assessment reliability, as could unconventional pilot behavior. 
Operator Measurement.  Risk is driven by transparency, complexity, resolution, and state 
assessment reliability.  The state of the art of direct operator measurement only provides limited 
resolution (e.g., 2-3 levels of workload), and even then, the accuracy from moment to moment is 
modest, thus leading to the higher risk for reliability.  
Environmental State.  Risk is driven by sensor/data reliability. The reliability and 
availability of communicated data could vary widely across types and situations.  Likewise, 
RISKS AND BENEFITS OF ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 11 
different sensors could be negatively impacted by noise.  This trigger could be compromised by 
data communication failure or human error. 
Mission Events.  Risk is driven by complexity, resolution, and reliability.  While phase-of-
flight is easily projected, other mission states could be much more difficult and may require 
model tracking fused with external event awareness.  If this trigger relies on complex, fused data, 
the system should project it judiciously to avoid false positives given that the projection inherits 
the uncertainty of task tracking and external event identification 
Environmental Events.  Risk is driven by resolution.  Environmental data resolution can 
be negatively impacted by the availability of high-dimensional data and the rate of external 
communications.  For example, when flying into a thunderstorm, communicated or sensed data 
may not “keep up” with the forward progress of the aircraft so the system could “miss” 
opportunities due to poor temporal resolution. 
System States and Modes.  Risk is driven by transparency. While generally a lower risk 
trigger, aircraft states or modes may not be as observable to pilots as other triggers.  This is 
particularly true of automation modes, as mode awareness is a well-known challenge for the 
design of modern flight decks (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997).  
Operator-initiated.  Risk was driven by resolution and pilot interaction requirements. 
Humans are not able to reliably assess hazardous states of their own cognition, such as 
distraction and information overload, making it more difficult for pilots to trigger automation 
adaptations in a timely manner.  Additionally, this trigger effectively adds another task for pilots, 
requiring the operator to remember to consider opportunities to initiate automation.  This 
requires prospective memory which is compromised under high workload. 
Spatio-Temporal Parameters (e.g., time, locations).  This was rated as the lowest risk 
trigger due to its relative simplicity (which enables human understanding), reliability, and 
precision.    
Adaptations.  The risks were averaged across 26 characteristics, as presented in Figure 5. 
The full ratings matrix can be found in Figure 12 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 5. Risk ratings for each adaptation type. 
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The group with the higher-risk ratings involved changes at the task level: changing the 
level of abstraction of information designed to support a task, offloading the entire task, 
changing the quantity and timing of task support, and task scheduling.  Intermediate risk 
adaptation types involved changes within a task:  sharing of a task with automation, interrupting 
one task with another (or blocking another task from interrupting the current one), and changing 
the amount or style of interaction during task execution.  Only changing the allocation of time 
(duration) for a task does not fit this pattern.  The final lower-rated risk adaptations types, 
included more incremental changes involving the changes to the pilot interface, changes to 
information content, and changes to the modality of information. 
The benefits were averaged across six characteristics, as presented in Figure 6.  The full 
ratings matrix can be found in Figure 13 in the Appendix. 
 
 
Figure 6. Benefit ratings of adaptation types. 
Adaptations to the user interfaces such as abstracting information, or changing the 
location/salience of the information, were judged to provide the highest benefit.  Adaptations 
such as changing the amount of interaction required or changing the time allocated for task 
performance were judged to provide the lowest benefit.  Interestingly, adaptations that on the 
surface appear to be a larger departure from current automation roles, such as managing 
interruptions, and offloading or sharing tasks dynamically between automation and the pilots, 
were judged to be of intermediate benefit.  The characteristics that were the strongest drivers of 
risks and benefits of the adaptations are discussed below for each adaptation type. 
Abstraction. This is the adaptation with the highest overall risk score, driven by error 
detectability most of all, but also knowledge and skill requirements, trainability, and misleading 
information potential. Information can be aggregated to present only the most salient information 
to decrease the processing time it takes to interpret the information. For example, converting 
detailed system information to an at-a-glance display that only conveys to the pilots if the system 
is within normal operating parameters. On the other hand, it might be difficult for pilots to 
understand how the system arrived at the abstraction and make it difficult to detect errors. 
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Additionally, as something that happens only in certain situations, pilots would have to be 
trained on how to do the task two ways, although the abstraction would have to be intuitive to be 
effective.  The adaptation may be disruptive, taking pilots out of their normal information-
gathering flow, which may affect pilot acceptance.  No longer working with raw data, pilots may 
lose situation awareness of information needed for other tasks.  However, high-level-of-
abstraction risks might be mitigated for highly determined tasks where pilots do not need 
significant insight or detailed data. 
This adaptation also has the highest overall benefit score, driven by situation awareness 
and workload.  It should enable more efficient acquisition and maintenance of the operational 
“big picture.”  The need for abstraction to be adaptive rather than a permanent design feature 
acknowledges the fact that there will still be situations when pilots need to review and analyze 
more detailed information in order to manage the situation correctly. 
Task Offloading.  Two risks rated highly were novelty and authority change.  This would 
represent a large change flight-deck task allocation from the current convention of strict and 
fixed separation between automation and pilot.  Despite the prevalence of automated flight 
modes, pilots are still accustomed to being the final authority of task execution. Both Boeing and 
Airbus automation design philosophies give ultimate control of the aircraft to the pilots; 
however, Airbus’ design philosophy allows the automation to override the pilot (Balog, 2011). 
For instance, the autopilot/flight director in the Airbus A380 has a traffic and collision 
Avoidance (TCAS) mode that allows the autopilot to automatically control the flight path to 
conduct a TCAS maneuver (Airbus, 2016). In contrast, Boeing’s design philosophy uses 
automation to aid the pilot in operation of the airplane, setting soft limits to control rather than 
Airbus’ hard limits (Abbot, 2001).  Competent, experienced pilots trust themselves to manage 
their own task load, so they will be skeptical of automation deciding when to take control. The 
feasibility of override or reversal decreases over time from the onset of the adaptation.  For 
example, if automation only partially completes a task, it may be challenging to transition control 
back to the pilot.  Likewise, for some tasks it may be a challenge to undo actions completed as a 
result of the task offloading. 
Benefits are driven by workload and situation awareness.  Interaction and coordination 
workload are reduced with task offloading. However, situation awareness benefits less for task 
offloading than for task sharing because it could be harder for pilots to monitor progress on 
entire tasks allocated to the automation, in comparison to the task-sharing case where they are 
still involved at the subtask level. 
Quantity & Timing.  This adaptation was rated highly compared to others, driven by 
transparency, error detectability, communication and coordination requirements, integration, and 
disruptiveness.  Many pilots prefer having more information and having it immediately.  If 
changes are subtle, they may be difficult to detect.  The timing aspect of this adaptation may 
have secondary effects on the communications and coordination requirements related to other 
tasks, in addition to the distraction potential.  
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The benefits were rated to be more modest compared to other adaptations.  Having the 
right information at the right time may benefit situation awareness, usability, and pilot 
performance.  
Prioritization.  Risk ratings were driven most by novelty and interference, as well as 
authority, trust/complacency, disruptiveness, and pilot interaction requirements. It may be 
difficult for pilots to properly align their trust in such a system.  Under high workload, they 
might not be skeptical enough of an automated prioritization of tasks, treating the adaptation 
direction as a de facto procedure.  Likewise, it may be difficult to identify failure modes.  Such a 
system would be very dependent on a robust task model, requiring knowledge of tasks across 
multiple systems.  By its very nature, this adaptation is likely to be disruptive and require 
additional pilot interaction to switch tasks when required. 
Benefits are driven by workload and pilot performance.  Less effort spent on managing 
tasks reduces workload directly.  This should also significantly improve pilot performance on 
other more directly mission-relevant aviate and navigate tasks because pilots will have more time 
and effort to dedicate to these tasks. 
Task Sharing.  Risk is driven by accuracy, pilot interaction requirements, sensitivity, and 
robustness.  In addition to appropriately decomposing a task into shareable sub-tasks, the system 
must also communicate task-state information regularly and accurately, and complete the sub-
tasks appropriately.  This adaptation will add interaction requirements because pilots will now be 
additionally monitoring the execution of the automation task responsibilities.  The system 
reasoning will be impacted by the reliability of the task-state assessment, which could result in a 
high robustness risk. 
Benefits are driven by workload and pilot performance.  Task sharing clearly has a 
workload benefit because automation is performing some subtasks that pilots normally perform.  
However, pilots will still need to monitor the automation performance of the shared tasks, so 
workload benefits will not be as high as if they were able to offload those tasks completely 
(Pritchett, Kim, & Feigh, 2014). This adaptation would also benefit pilot performance because 
task performance should be easier. 
Duration.  Risk is driven by pilot performance, acceptability, trust, and novelty.  If the 
time allocation has been modified to accommodate other tasks in the workflow, the pilot would 
be faced with the choice of not completing the task in time, or perhaps reducing the quality of the 
result in order to make the deadline.  This tradeoff may be appropriate, but may be a difficult one 
for pilots to accept.  Although there is some precedent for this type of adaptation (Required-
Time-of-Arrival or Top-of-Descent as a deadline), the allocation of more or less time for tasks 
may be seen as novel.  The more precise the timing requirements, the more an error would be 
compounded. 
Benefits are driven by workload and pilot performance.  If pilots are given a time budget 
for a task, this would provide a smoother task flow and fewer missed or near-missed deadlines 
overall, thus achieving a better balance of workload across the entire flight.  This should improve 
overall pilot performance as well.  
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Interruptions Management (Timing).  Risk is driven by authority, predictability, 
interference, and integration.  By directing attention, this adaptation has increased authority over 
pilot’s task priorities, and intentionally interferes with current task flow.  Such a system would 
need to be highly integrated across systems in order to coordinate interruptions from multiple 
systems.  
Benefits are driven by situation awareness, pilot performance, and error detection.  The 
benefits are judged to be high because it brings information to the pilot’s attention that he or she 
may have otherwise missed. Such a system may also reduce unnecessary task switching due to 
interruptions. 
Amount of Interaction.  Risk is driven by complexity and transparency.  Given a 
substantial change from a fixed interaction frequency, this adaptation could be perceived as more 
complex.  There would likely be a non-intuitive mapping between the change in parameters and 
the frequency of change.   
No characteristics for this adaptation showed a high potential benefit relative to other 
adaptations.  If more interaction is deemed appropriate in order to encourage pilots to consider 
more details of a situation or to ensure full pilot understanding of a situation, then situation 
awareness should be increased and errors might be better detected. 
Interaction Style.  Risk is driven by acceptability and novelty.  Varying the timing, 
politeness, and method of interaction could be disconcerting to pilots and negatively impact the 
acceptability of this adaptation.  While manipulating the timing of interactions could have 
situation awareness and performance benefits, it could be disrupting for pilots accustomed to a 
certain style of interactions.     
The main benefit of tailoring the interaction style to the individual or situation is usability. 
Adapting how terse or verbose the interaction is, and what type of communication protocol is 
used, should make the interaction more natural, convenient, and usable. 
Interface Features.  This adaptation was ranked as lower risk, driven by 
trust/complacency.  Pilots may become complacent because most of these adaptations do not 
foster pilot skepticism.  Most pilots are familiar with display changes, so they will be more likely 
to accept changes without scrutinizing the automation reasoning behind them.  Humans have a 
tendency to economize effort in sampling information (Hertwig, Baron, Weber, & Erev, 2006); 
the most convenient information source would be preferentially sampled over less convenient 
information sources.   
Benefits are driven by usability, error detection, and situation awareness. Pilots will need 
less effort to search for information and would be assisted in distinguishing the most important 
information, improving usability.  Assuring that the right information is being attended to should 
help pilots detect errors and improve their overall situation awareness. 
Modality.  This adaptation was ranked lower risk.  A change in modality is very salient and 
could distract pilots from ongoing tasks.   
Benefits are driven by situation awareness.  Modality changes should make it more likely 
that information will be attended to when presented on a channel that has more bandwidth, given 
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other perceptual demands of the situation.  This change in salience will also effectively direct 
pilots’ attention to high-priority information. 
Evaluation by Pilots 
Method 
Objective.  The objective of the evaluation was to collect pilot feedback to augment the 
risks and benefits ratings from a pilot perspective.  
Participants.  Seven male and one female pilot participated in the study; seven are 
currently captains and one is a lead test pilot.  All were rated as Air Transport Pilots, four were 
instructors, and current aircraft type ratings ranged across general aviation, business, and 
commercial.  The participants averaged 56 years of age (range 43-67), 8,475 (4,100-20,000) total 
flying hours, and 2,800 (100-7,000) hours in glass cockpits. 
Protocol.  Participants were briefed on general types of triggers, with one or two examples 
for each, followed by scales in which participants rated the potential risk (1= very low risk, 5= 
very high risk) of each of the eight trigger types rated by the analysts .  Participants were given 
the same risk definitions as the analysts. They provided one overall risk rating (rather than rate 
characteristics individually), and asked to provide a rationale for their risk rating.  Participates 
were reminded to base their ratings on the general type of trigger, not the specific examples 
provided.  
To assess the adaptation risks and benefits, eight “paper” storyboards were developed to 
represent notional adaptive automation concepts across the range of the key adaptation types, and 
with different combinations of risks and benefits (see Table 5).  
Table 5. Adaptive systems concepts chosen for storyboard development. 
Adaptation  Category Risk Benefit Flight-deck Concept  
Task Sharing  Function allocation Medium Medium Clearance negotiation and entry  
Task Offloading  Function allocation High Medium Clearance negotiation and entry  
Interface Features  Interaction Low High Context-based highlighting  
Modality  Interaction Low Medium Text to speech for annunciations  
Abstraction  Content High High Weather integration and abstraction  
Quantity & Timing  Content Low High Phase-of-Flight based de-cluttering display  
Prioritization  Task management High Medium Communication scheduler  
Interruption Mgmt  Task management Medium Medium Alert escalation  
 
Participants were presented the storyboards as a short narrative description of the 
circumstances under which the adaptation might occur, the adaptation itself, and accompanied by 
pictures where possible.  As an (abbreviated) example, two storyboards for the Modification of 
Function Allocation are provided as follows. In the first example, participants were 
briefed/updated on the move to data-link as the primary means of communication in Next 
Generation (NextGen) Air Traffic Control (ATC). Crew will receive a new clearance from ATC 
via the Controller Pilot Data-Link Communication (CPDLC). Digital communication will allow 
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clearances to be electronically sent rather than by voice. Data-link will increase the frequency 
and complexity of cockpit text-based communications. The analysis of clearances requires pilots 
to assess several parameters that influence clearance feasibility. A task-sharing application would 
offload some (but not all) of the pilot tasks to automation. Increased automation assistance would 
only be offered in situations where pilot workload was high and time criticality of the incoming 
CPDLC message was high. The exact level of assistance offered would be determined by these 
triggers. As an example of the task-sharing adaptation, when a pilot has the greatest need (i.e. 
high pilot workload, very little time to complete) the system could evaluate the clearance and 
display the relevant information for deciding whether to accept the clearance (see Figure 7 left). 
Once the Evaluate button is pressed, the system could make a recommendation of the appropriate 
response (see Figure 7 middle). The pilot could then accept or reject the recommendation. In the 
second example, continuing this scenario, a Task Offloading adaptation would go beyond the 
Task-Sharing adaptation to offload all of the pilot tasks to automation. The system takes a higher 
level of control: automation carries out all the tasks associated with evaluating a CPDLC request, 
implements the requested changes to the flight plan (Figure 7 right), and notifies the pilot that an 
action has been taken. 
  
 
Figure 7. Clearance evaluation task sharing ((a) and (b)) and task offloading (c). 
In addition to this storyboard and illustrations, participants were also given descriptions of 
other examples to broaden their exposure to the concepts within an adaptation category. In 
describing the “task offloading” example, participants were briefed on other concepts. For 
instance, the automation could take over the flight maneuver in a situation where a Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory (TCAS RA) is issued, the pilot has not 
complied within 5 seconds, and the automation confirms that the TCAS RA maneuver would not 
jeopardize the flight (assumes a very accurate surveillance system, such as ADS-B). This has the 
potential to reduce the number of cases where a delay in responding to the TCAS RA causes a 
near miss or potential mid-air collision.  
The goal was to provide, for each adaptation type, concrete examples based on one detailed 
example plus several brief descriptions of other examples, rather than just provide a definition. 
Participants were asked to base their ratings on the general type of adaptation, and not on the 
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specific examples provided.  Participants rated risk and benefits on a scale of 1 to 5.  Pilots 
provided one overall risk and one overall benefit rating for each adaptation type.  Rationale was 
collected to understand what drove their ratings. 
Results 
Trigger Risks. Figure 8 compares risk ratings between pilots and analysts. The two ratings 
were significantly and strongly correlated (r(6)=.73, p = .037). Generally, all risk ratings 
comparisons were within 0.5, except for spatio-temporal triggers, where analysts rated it the least 
risky overall (1.8), driven mainly by transparency.  Spatio-temporal information will become 
more important as NextGen implementation matures.  Pilots commented that the triggers they 
rated lower risk were those already in use today. Pilots felt that the higher-risk triggers of 
Operator Measurement and Task Status Both were difficult to accomplish, complex, and subject 
to individual variability. Both approaches may not have the levels of accuracy pilots said they 
needed to accept the system. 
 
Figure 8. Trigger risk ratings for analysts and pilots. 
Adaptation Risks.  Figure 9 compares risk ratings between pilots and analysts.  There was 
a non-significant correlation of r(6) = .16 (p = n.s.) between the two ratings. Overall, pilots rated 
the risks lower than analysts, except for Task Offloading and Modality. 
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Figure 9. Adaptations risk ratings for analysts and pilots. 
Task offloading was rated by pilots and analysts as the riskiest adaptation type.  Pilots 
commented that the principal driver of their higher-risk rating was that the adaptation takes pilots 
out of the decision-making loop.  Pilots were concerned if missing, but needed, information is 
shifted to another modality. 
Pilot risk ratings were lower than pilots in the remaining six pairs of ratings. One 
explanation is because the analysts rated 26 characteristics for each adaptation type, some 
characteristics may be redundant, giving more weight to the riskier characteristics and driving up 
the average risk (a limitation discussed later). The lower-risk group where pilots and analysts 
agree (e.g. interface features), participants felt that these adaptations did not take control out of 
the hands of pilots. Pilots commented that some of the ideas presented to them were just 
extensions of simple adaptive systems in use today, with perhaps more automation intelligence, 
sophistication, and complexity.  Pilots felt that the implementation details of most of these 
concepts that will ultimately determine the risks and benefit levels.  
  Adaptation Benefits.  Figure 10 compares benefit ratings between pilots and analysts. 
There was a non-significant correlation of r(6) = .34 (p = n.s.) between the two ratings. Pilots 
rated benefits higher than analysts, just as analysts rated more overall risks than pilots. In 
general, pilots were very positive about the storyboards they reviewed as part of the evaluation.  
Pilots generally liked the adaptive nature of the system, although there was skepticism about the 
benefit of adaptive systems over good full-time, well-designed automation concepts. 
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Figure 10. Adaptations benefit ratings for analysts and pilots. 
Discussion 
There may be a higher risk for adaptive systems, as compared to full-time automated 
systems, simply because they turn adaptations on and off based on aspects of the situation.  Both 
pilots and analysts felt that operator-initiated adaptations, more were lower risk, given that the 
operator is still in control of when adaptations turn on and off. Pilots and analysts agreed that 
task tracking and operator measurement were the highest rated risk triggers. Both triggers are 
novel, and would require a high level of reliability given that they are not easily transparent to 
the pilots. Understanding why and predicting when the automation triggers change requires 
knowledge of the conditions governing the transition (Javaux, 2002).  Both analysts and pilots 
identified inherent risks when the level of complexity and transparency reaches a point where the 
adaptive system’s behavior is perceived as non-deterministic (stochastic) by pilots.  One pilot 
speculated that once the number of triggering conditions approached five or more, pilots would 
lose the ability to understand what the system is doing, and what it will do next, which the pilot 
equated to the loss of pilot awareness of the automation. The pilots in the study wanted the 
triggers to be understandable and simple; however, if the system “got it right”, they were less 
concerned with transparency and complexity. Further research will be needed to quantify the 
level of complexity and transparency that drives the perception of non-determinism, and the level 
of reliability that may mitigate the risk.  
Analysis identified the principal drivers of adaptations risks/benefits as the level of control 
vs. information adaptation.  Pilots rated adaptations that changed information displays as lower 
risk than adaptations that potentially affected the direct control of the aircraft.  Pilots felt that 
adaptive systems should always request permission to take control of the aircraft, reflected in the 
higher-risk ratings with task offloading adaptations where the pilot is taken out of the decision-
making loop, which can lead to surprises.  While information support was useful, pilots preferred 
designs where the human makes the final decision. Pilots clearly saw the potential benefits of 
increasingly active automation that could anticipate pilot needs and automatically trigger 
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changes in automated support.  Those benefits, however, will only be realized when carefully 
weighed against the costs.  
There were several lessons learned that inform future efforts in this area.  First, participants 
reinforced the lesson that adaptive systems are not new to the flight deck, nor are pilots’ 
perceptions of the unpredictability of automated systems.  Therefore, operational data could be 
collected on potential risks related to both adaptive systems and those that appear to the user to 
exhibit non-deterministic behavior. Second, it became obvious that pilots in our study thought 
about flight-deck automation somewhat differently than did the analysts in our study. Many of 
the nuances that the analysts focused on were unimportant to the pilots – they very elegantly 
simplify problems with adaptive systems to factors such as whether the behavior of the system is 
understandable or not, and whether it “gets it right.” Finally, pilots were concerned that the 
complexity of these types of systems may make the system less predictable, and therefore less 
acceptable in control applications.  Although acceptability may relate to many other 
characteristics such as complexity and transparency, it is fundamentally related to whether 
adaptations are perceived to provide value to the pilots without resulting in an annoying behavior 
or impediment to pilots’ ability to perform their tasks. This could be the biggest challenge for all 
but the simplest, most basic adaptive systems – will the adaptation reliably and consistently 
make changes that pilots need or want? 
This work represents pilots’ and analysts’ assessments of the risks and benefits of 
increasingly complex and capable adaptive systems under development to meet the demands of 
NextGen. As such, the results presented in this paper must be considered preliminary, given the 
subjective nature of the data and the small number of both analysts used in the analysis and pilots 
in the evaluation.  Furthermore, using a component framework to assess potential adaptive 
system risks and benefits from a pilot perspective was useful, but not sufficient, to identify all 
potential risks and benefits.  The set of 26 characteristics may have contained overlap, leading 
some risks to potentially be over-weighted because two characteristics may be redundant. An 
independent set of characteristics would provide a better basis for any assessment tool to 
evaluate risks and benefits of adaptive systems. To address this limitation, work is being 
conducted to develop a systematic assessment of the characteristics that would reveal any 
redundancies or mismatches between them. Similarly, equally weighting characteristics could 
add risk, and not considering inter-dependencies among the characteristics may be a weakness of 
the current analysis.  Similarly, just classifying triggers as a certain type only partially tells the 
story of the potential risk; the number of triggers, the combination of triggers of different types, 
and the observability of the triggering events are all very important in identifying risks.    
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Appendix 
 
Figure 11. Trigger risk ratings for each combination of adaptation type and characteristic. 
 
Figure 12. Adaptation risk ratings for each combination of adaptation type and characteristic. 
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Figure 13. Adaptation benefit ratings for each combination of adaptation type and characteristic. 
 
 
 
